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Abstract
How to separate the office from the officeholder is one of the most difficult questions
in the empirical study of institutions and leadership. We argue that provided there is an
indicator for the overall individual influence among members of the political elite and
there is sufficient variability among individuals taking the same office, being promoted
and demoted into different offices over time, we can separate latent individual and
institutional components of influence at an aggregate, regime level. Our latent variable
model thus provides a new tool to measure the degree of regime deinstitutionalisation.
Using expert surveys that assess the ranking of the top political actors in Russia from
1994–2011, and restricting personal effects to those that are constant over time, we find
that on average office dominates individual by the order of two. We discuss regime
deinstitutionalisation in comparative perspective; demonstrate the generalisability by
analysing Ukraine; account for patronage networks.
Key Words: leadership, deinstitutionalisation, latent factor model, Russian and Post-
Soviet politics
Does the political office that an individual occupies primarily determine one’s overall political
influence, or can the same office be strengthened or weakened depending on the officeholder? Re-
cently, there has been a surge of scholarship that examined with new rigour whether leaders matter
(e.g., Dewan and Myatt, 2008; Goemans and Chiozza, 2009; Horowitz and Stam, forthcoming;
Jones and Olken, 2009). Nonetheless, it remains extremely difficult to attribute causality to partic-
ular officeholders, discern the effects of leaders from other factors, or disentangle the office from
the individual officeholder (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011; Shamir, 2012; Sheffer, 1993).
This paper directly confronts the empirical difficulty of separating the effects of leaders on
policy, thereby addressing a centuries-old conundrum in political science. We do this through a
novel measurement tool for the separation of different sources — or components — personal (of-
ficeholder) and institutional (office) — of the individual’s influence. This approach largely permits
us to side-step assumptions about the relative effects of individual traits, followers and contextual
factors, and to identify the effects of leaders and institutions in a non-experimental setting. The
expert survey we rely on provides one observed variable measuring the perceived policy influence
for the most important actors within a political regime over time and thus the data itself cannot,
at first sight, provide information on the relative importance of individual and office.1 However,
because over time different actors can hold the same office and the same actor can hold different
offices, we can capture the corresponding changes in influence scores and use this variation to
gauge the relative importance of the person and the office. We therefore measure, at an individual
level, the relative attribution of influence to office and individual, and, at an aggregate level, the
1An online supplementary appendix is available at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/jop. Data
and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the results will be made available at http://www.
joselkink.net/research upon acceptance.
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overall level of regime institutionalisation. The Bayesian latent variable model that we rely on im-
poses several restricting assumptions, such as that neither the powers of a particular office nor the
personal influence of a particular individual change over time. Therefore, we measure the effects
of time-invariant aspects of the personal component, e.g., education, prior career and personality,
and relegate more idiosyncratic aspects to the residual. However, we also explain and demonstrate
the model validity under different assumptions.
As our primary case study, we analyse the contribution of office and the individual to political
influence in Russia between 1994 and 2011. The game of musical chairs played by Presidents
Putin and Medvedev in 2008, and again in 2012, suggests that Russia shows the characteristics of
a deinstitutionalised regime, of a “dual state” that combines formal institutions with elements of
a personalised regime (Sakwa, 2011). This provides us with an interesting opportunity to assess
institutional influence in a regime where the institutional rank of the top official does not corre-
spond with their effective rank, “a policy called politique de doublure, or ‘politics of understudy”’
(Chehabi and Linz, 1998, 17). The degree of regime deinstitutionalisation, whether in Russia or
more generally, is difficult to gauge as the comparative literature lacks the required measurement
tools. Our findings indicate that even in Russia institutions matter and actors connected through
patronage — which we control for explicitly — exercise their influence primarily through for-
mal posts. These conclusions are corroborated by similar results in a second case study using
Ukrainian data. Our results suggest that regimes which gravitate toward personalism can be more
institutionalised than they appear.
After a review of the empirical difficulties in studying the effects of institutions and leaders,
we discuss how the concepts of the office and officeholder relate to regime institutionalisation. We
explain the expert survey data next, present the statistical model and its underlying assumptions,
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and follow with a detailed discussion of the results.
Leaders, Institutions, and Deinstitutionalisation
One of the central questions in social science is whether institutions matter (North, 1990). Be-
cause institutions emerge and operate in a real world environment, the problems of identification
and measurement are unavoidable (e.g. Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson, 2001). It is difficult to
isolate institutional effects from those of structural conditions or even from the strength of power-
holders (e.g. Przeworski, 2004). Despite the continuing debates over endogeneity however, insti-
tutional arguments are rightly at the fore of political science research. Similarly to institutional
scholars, leadership students must separate the effects of leaders from a larger context — leaders
occupy offices in some predefined structures (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011, 6). For instance, Canes-
Wrone (2006), in order to attribute particular policies to individual presidents rather than to the
office itself or other factors, examines historical evidence that incumbent presidents held prior be-
liefs about appropriate policies. The effects of leadership are also explored through experiments
(e.g. Humphreys, Masters and Sandbu, 2006) or a quasi-experimental design.2
In practice, empirical separation of office from officeholder is extremely difficult. Indeed,
regimes usually attract individuals with traits already conforming to existing norms; people often
encounter cognitive biases while attributing causality to leaders (Patty and Weber, 2007). Likewise,
there is no agreement as to what scholars of leadership should examine. Indeed, many leadership
studies are concerned with the effects of institutions on leader survival in office rather than with
2See Jones and Olken (2009) on assassinations. The institutional context following the death
of a long-standing autocrat can change dramatically however, even if a successor enters the same
nominal office.
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the effects of leaders as such (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Studies exist that examine
leadership primarily as the process of interaction between leaders and followers (e.g. Baturo and
Mikhaylov, 2013; Dewan and Myatt, 2008), or examine the effects of leaders’ traits (e.g., Horowitz
and Stam, forthcoming). In a recent review, Shamir (2012, 353) underlines that the study of lead-
ership encompasses “the interaction between the leader, the followers, and the situation.” How to
tell leadership effects from those of personal traits, those arising from relations between leaders
and their supporters, and of offices they occupy, is unclear (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011).
As we explain below, we propose a novel technique that enables us to separate different com-
ponents — personal (officeholder) and institutional (office) — of an individual’s influence.3 Fur-
thermore, because the effects of particular leaders can be idiosyncratic and conflated with those of
other factors, we do not focus on specific offices or individuals. Instead, taking the conceptualisa-
tion of institutions as relatively enduring rules “that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover
of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences” [emphasis is ours] (March
and Olsen, 2006, 3), we aggregate the contribution of personal and institutional components of
individual political influence among all relevant offices and officeholders within the regime over-
all, in our case study. At the aggregate level, the resulting quantity is a ratio of office to personal
components, or a direct measure of regime institutionalisation.
Regime deinstitutionalisation is the term used to assess the relative importance of political insti-
tutions, the routinisation of norms and institutional practices — or lack thereof (Huntington, 1968,
12–24). Scholars infer the degree of institutionalisation, or personalisation, from the presence of
institutions (Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999) or behaviour (Baturo, 2010). However, formal institu-
3Scholars have long recognised that the leader’s power can be rooted either in the institutional
structure (in the office) or in the personal qualities of the officeholder (Weber, 1978, 1140–41).
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tions can exist in personalised regimes also, primarily buttressing the existing patronage networks
and having very limited real authority (Wright, 2008). It is also common for individuals to exert
more influence from their ostensibly lower-ranked offices than their nominal superiors (Chehabi
and Linz, 1998, 36). In such cases, the degree of regime institutionalisation is hard to gauge.
Provided we are able to measure the individual’s influence over time and know what offices
one occupied, we will be able to observe whether a particular office becomes more powerful when
it is taken by a particular individual or whether the individual becomes more influential when she
changes offices. Therefore, our analyses only require sufficient variation in the identity of office-
holders and the offices they occupy. We assume that the influence derived from the particular office
in its institutional context, and the influence to be attributed to the individual, are time-invariant
for each office and each individual respectively. As Rose (1991, 10) underscores, the influence of
office “exists independently of its transitory incumbents; it is there before a particular individual
becomes prime minister and it will remain after the individual leaves,” therefore it can be plau-
sibly treated as constant over time.4 The overall personal influence can vary significantly over
time, however: politicians can fall in or out of favour; experience a scandal, gaining or losing their
personal clout. Instead, following the trait-approach conceptualisation of leadership (Northouse
2009, 15–38; Stogdill 1948), we restrict the personal effects of officeholder to be time-invariant
and primarily measure the effects of personal background and inherent traits such as education,
intelligence, psychological type, prior career and skills. Indeed, we know that the observable
background traits of leaders can have significant effects on various policies, for example, mili-
tarised behaviour or economic reform (e.g. Bunce, 1981; Dreher et al., 2009; Horowitz and Stam,
4Whenever a particular office undergoes manifest changes in powers, for example, elected and
appointed governors, we treat it as two different types of office.
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forthcoming); their psychological predispositions also matter (e.g. Hermann and Kegley, 1995).
Because an overall personal authority is highly volatile and idiosyncratic, our approach primarily
accounts for the time-invariant personal aspects of influence and omits the impact of more volatile
personal clout and reputation.5 We relax the assumption of constant personal effects in additional
analyses, however.
Office and Officeholder in the Expert Survey of Individual Influence
We attempt to estimate the overall level of institutionalisation by investigating the average im-
portance of office or officeholder across a wide range of individuals over a long time period. The
collection of observational data that accounts for individual political influence over various policies
for a considerable number of officeholders and offices over time would be a daunting, if not impos-
sible, exercise. In similar measurement tasks whereby the number of cases is high and the precise
operationalisation is difficult to define, while the concept itself has a reasonably consistently-shared
meaning, expert surveys became a popular tool (Meyer and Booker, 2001). Expert surveys are not
only practical when other data about latent phenomena is not available, they often outperform other
methods, such as public opinion surveys (Benoit and Laver, 2006, 71–77). An extensive literature
exists on expert surveys (e.g. Meyer and Booker, 2001) and using perceived influence as a measure
of influence more generally (Polsby, 1963, 45–51), starting with the pioneering work of Hunter
(1953). Studies also exist that employ surveys to compare the political influence of top national
executives (e.g. O’Malley, 2007).
A unique expert survey exists concerning the level of individual political influence in Russia,
100 Most Influential (Leading) Politicians of Russia, conducted by the survey company Vox Populi
5We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for this important point.
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(from 2002 Vox Populi-T), together with the Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily. The expert survey pro-
vides monthly data on the perceived individual influence on politics and various policies, whether
foreign, military, fiscal, or law and order, and is the key variable we rely on in our analysis. This
indicator is on the same scale for all individuals in the panel. A group of experts evaluates the in-
fluence of leading political actors and assigns monthly scores on a scale of one to ten. The average
score for each actor is then calculated and reported and individual ranks from one to one hundred
are also assigned on the basis of this score. The survey does not report estimates of uncertainty
but the number of experts each month is considerable and typically numbers around 50 individu-
als. These experts follow politics on a daily basis and many report professionally in the media on
minute political developments. We employ survey results from November 1994 to March 2011;
the data represents the uninterrupted monthly series of the Top 100 panel of political actors in this
period, ranging from the president (typically) at the top to regional politicians and civil servants
down below. While this survey has been used by sociologists who chart changes in the compo-
sition of elites (e.g. Kinsbursky, 2003; Kryshtanovskaya, 2002), political science scholarship has
ignored it despite its scope and breadth of data. Altogether, there are 484 unique individuals in the
period and 19,675 observations in total. On average each individual remains in the survey for four
years; every month five to ten individuals exit and enter the ranks, many do so repeatedly.
Clearly, expert surveys are not without their problems however. Przeworski (2004) argues
that the expert assessment of political risk in a widely cited study by Acemoglu, Robinson and
Johnson (2001) is contaminated by the experts’ perceptions of risk in wealthy countries. Equally,
we rely on the expert perceptions of influence. We do not measure observable effects of such
influence on particular policies. The assumption is that surveys generating measures of perceived
influence provide valid estimates of policy influence. Furthermore, for the decomposition we are
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interested in — the separation of office and officeholder — additional requirements are placed on
the data: it is conceivable that experts simply use the information about observed appointments
and dismissals as informational shortcuts and assign scores based on these cues alone. In the
supplementary materials therefore, we examine the survey validity in detail. We find that while
experts do take into account promotions and demotions, they also consider other factors such as
public opinion approval and media coverage of particular individuals and their personal traits; the
experts even apparently react to monthly oil price changes for those with the energy portfolio. In
general, this adds to our confidence that the survey is not simply a reflection of expert perceptions
as to how important particular offices are.
The survey only reports individual names and their scores. Therefore, for each individual
officeholder we must assign the “office” that he or she occupies.6 Having collected detailed in-
formation about the particular office for each individual over time, for instance, the office of the
minister of transport or head of a particular state company, we further aggregate these posts into
48 more general offices. Some of the offices — 18 out of 48 — do not require aggregation, such
as that of prime minister which is always occupied by one individual at any given time. Other
offices, such as that of the minister of transport, is assigned to the category of cabinet minister,
various. The choice of 48 office categories is relatively arbitrary. A very low number of offices,
however, would lead to a very low number of changes in office and thus provide too little data for
the estimation of latent factors. A high number of offices on the other hand would lead to too few
6The supplementary appendix provides details on the published sources for the survey, our cod-
ing rules and additional sources for the type of office, actors and their background, as well as
various auxiliary variables. Additionally, we plot the raw data distributions of various office cate-
gories and include sensitivity analyses on the impact of varying the levels of office aggregation.
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individuals within the same office to estimate the importance of personal influence.
[Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 plots the distribution of influence for each post separately for the 1990s and 2000s.
While the ranking of offices, which in turn depends on the average score of influence, has certain
similarities between the period of Yeltsin’s presidency and that of his successor, important differ-
ences are also visible. Thus, even though the president and prime minister are at the top in both
periods, in the 1990s the mayor of Moscow keeps the third place and the upper chamber’s speaker
fifth, while in the 2000s the former is only fifth, while the latter is a distant nineteenth. Also, in
the 2000s even those who are dismissed from their posts usually remain in the top ranks. The fact
that the majority of individuals remain in the survey, yet frequently change office, permits us to
evaluate the relative contribution of personal and institutional components to the observed scores.
Empirical Estimation of the Two Sources of Individual Influence
To estimate the unobserved levels of personal and institutional influence, we will make use of
what is known as the Item-Response Theory (IRT) model in the educational literature. The typical
example for such a model is the analysis of test scores among a group of students (Reckase, 1997).
The scores can be assumed to be driven by two factors: the ability of students and the difficulty of
the question. The estimation of these two unobserved variables is made possible by the assumption
that the difficulty of the question does not change when different students answer the question and
the ability of the student does not change from one question to the other. This approach has, for
instance, been applied to estimate latent ideological policy space (see Quinn, 2004) and latent
democracy scores (Treier and Jackman, 2008). Our model is as follows:
SCOREit = β0 +β1ηOjit +β2η
P
i +β4τt + εit , (1)
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whereby SCORE is the influence score; ηO and ηP the latent influence scores based on the office
and on the person or officeholder, respectively; τ a cubic time spline; and i refers to the person,
t the month, and j the office category. Each individual politician i appears at most once in each
month, while the same office category j can have multiple occupants in a month. ηOjit therefore
denotes the latent office influence score of the office category occupied by individual i at time t,
while the office influence score of the particular office category ηOj does not vary over time. Both
ηOj and η
P
i are constant over time for each office and person, and are assumed to be normally
distributed. Nevertheless, we conduct additional analyses that include the effects of patronage and
fit an auxiliary model that relaxes the assumptions of time-invariant ηOj and η
P
i , as explained below.
We do not add further control variables, since what we are investigating is a decomposition,
a measurement of underlying dimensions of influence, not a causal relationship. This is also the
reason for using a time spline instead of, for instance, a lagged SCORE on the right-hand side.
With the latter, we would be investigating partial adjustments over time, while we are interested in
breaking down average levels over time.
τ represents a cubic spline to control for the fact that the average level of influence on the
hundred most influential politicians changes over time without there being any clear indication
that this has substantive meaning. The spline is defined as the predicted scores based on a linear
regression of the form: SCOREit = γ0+γ1t +γ2t2+γ3t3+γ4d+γ5dt +γ6dt2+γ7dt3+uit , with d a
dummy variable to capture a strong discontinuity visible in the raw data. In all model specifications
τ is based on the entire dataset over the whole period.
ηO and ηP are both standardised, such that we can take the β1 and β2 estimates as being on a
comparable scale. This implies that a higher estimate of β1 can be interpreted as a change in ηO
having a relatively greater impact than a similar change in ηP on the overall reputational influence
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score of the individual politician. Furthermore, as argued earlier, the analysis here concerns a
decomposition, not a causal analysis, and “importance” here should be seen as whether a difference
in ηP or in ηO would be related to a larger difference in personal political influence (cf. Blalock,
1961, 867). Because of this, our primary interest is in the ratio of the two β-coefficients which can
be interpreted as the relative importance of office to that of officeholder in determining the overall
influence and which becomes our measurement of regime institutionalisation:
ζ=
exp(β∗1)
exp(β∗2)
=
β1
β2
. (2)
Primarily because of the need for uncertainty estimates on the ζ-ratio, we take a Bayesian
approach which allows us to sample directly from the posterior distribution of this ratio. In a
Bayesian framework, it is required to provide prior information. For a sufficiently large dataset
such as this expert survey, the impact of the choice of prior will be minimal. β0, β∗1, β
∗
2 and β3 all
have a normal prior distribution with mean zero and precision 10−4. The prior normal distribution
of ηOj has a mean of zero and precision 1 for all j and of η
P
i mean zero and precision 1 for all i.
The prior of the precision of the error term follows a gamma distribution Γ(10−3,10−3). To make
estimation possible, two inconsequential contraints are applied to the model: the β parameter is
transformed such that β1 = exp(β∗1) and β2 = exp(β
∗
2), and the variances of the latent variables are
constrained to σ2ηO = σ
2
ηP = 1. The model parameters are estimated by sampling from the posterior
distribution using a Gibbs sampler. The main models have been estimated with 11,000 iterations,
whereby the first 1,000 iterations are discarded. All models pass the Heidelberg-Welch tests for
convergence (Heidelberger and Welch, 1983).
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Results and Discussion
[Table 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 provides the estimates for the regression coefficients and ζ-ratio. The estimations have
been repeated for different subsets of the data.7 The first column covers the entire period, followed
by data covering the 1990s (Yeltsin), 2000s (Putin), as well as Yeltsin and early Putin’s period
(until December 2003, fourth column), and the “late” Putin period after December 2003 which
was characterised by the dominance of the president and federal centre, in the fifth column.
The interpretation of the β-coefficients themselves is of only limited relevance: the more in-
teresting results can be found in the fifth row, providing the ζ-ratio. For the full period since data
collection started, this ratio is estimated as 1.99, implying that office is almost twice as important
than officeholder in terms of the overall influence score. The most striking outcome visible in
Table 1 is the relative stability of the results over time. While under the presidency of Putin, the
ζ-ratio is lower, this difference is (just) within the margin of error of these estimates. This suggests
that our model genuinely picks up on a structural aspect of power relations in the Russian political
elite, rather than being dependent on particular idiosyncratic factors for specific time periods.
The dominance of office over individual is clear in different periods. Still, the period following
the December 2003 elections that was characterised by the exit of many officials who had gained
influence in the 1990s and by the increased dominance of Putin’s inner circle can be characterised
as more deinstitutionalised with office still dominating officeholder, albeit by the order of one
and a half only. Indeed, consider the case of President Medvedev — even though Medvedev
7The categories of “businessman”, “separatist, Chechnya”, “former politician”, “media, var-
ious” and “other” are excluded. Indeed, “businessmen” or “former politicians” do not occupy
political office by definition and their personal influence is equal to the overall influence.
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(2008–12) occupied the most politically powerful office, his Prime Minister, Putin, clearly pre-
empted the former in overall influence despite being outranked formally (Baturo and Mikhaylov,
2013; Sakwa, 2011). The divergence between office and officeholder’s influence can also be found
across different ranks of the political elite, exemplified by nominally subordinate officials arguably
exerting more influence than their superiors — for instance, a deputy head of the presidential
administration over a head of that administration, and over time.
The fact that many political actors, including Vladimir Putin in 2008–12, were powerful not
because of their posts, but despite them, indicates a certain degree of deinstitutionalisation. Many
observers believe that the regime has deinstitutionalised significantly under Putin (Petrov 2011,
6–7; Sheinis 2004, 47). Russia features what O’Donnell (1996) defines as weak institutions: there
are frequent changes of formal political institutions and rules, especially in the early to mid–1990s
and the 2000–2004 period, and compliance with rules is low. At the same time, even though many
actors gained their influence through personal connections under Putin’s “patronal presidentialism”
(Hale, 2005) and informal networks underpin formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006),
there was a broad consensus among elites co-opted into the ruling party by the end of the 2000s
(e.g. Remington and Reuter, 2009). A plethora of formal political institutions exist through which
actors make their careers. These can also indicate, in comparative perspective, that a regime is
institutionalised (Gandhi, 2008). In other words, the existence of institutions that are designed
to manage the intra-elite conflict alongside extensive patronage networks and constant shuffling
of the same officeholders between offices poses a puzzle as to the extent to which the regime is
deinstitutionalised.
The main empirical result that we obtain addresses this puzzle directly. In Russia, and even
in the “late” Putin period, institutions matter more than the officeholders who occupy them. Our
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findings support the opinion of many scholars regarding the importance of institutions in Rus-
sia (e.g. Remington and Reuter, 2009), yet they also validate various qualitative assessments of
personalisation under Putin among area specialists (e.g. Sakwa, 2011, 72).
[Figure 2 ABOUT HERE]
To assess the model validity and, in particular the ζ-ratio, we can evaluate the predicted values
for individual politicians or particular offices over time. Figure 2 illustrates the logic behind the
estimations using four examples. Firstly, the offices of prime minister and chief of staff to the
president are shown. Influence derived from any particular office is by assumption constant over
time, and the variation between different occupants of these offices, therefore, will be due to their
personal influence. The gradual decline in the importance of the prime minister can be clearly seen
— Fradkov in 2007 is widely regarded as an unimportant bureaucrat — with a sudden transfer of
influence from the presidential office to that of the prime minister when Putin chose to depart the
presidency in 2008. The evolution of the chief of staff’s influence also follows a pattern in line
with what observers of Russian politics would recognise.
Secondly, we show the pattern for two individual politicians. In the bottom plots, the level of
influence due to officeholder is constant by assumption, with the variation over time determined
by the level of influence derived from various offices. We can clearly see the steep rise to power of
Prime Minister Primakov and his subsequent decline into a far less influential position, that of head
of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Sobyanin, the successor to Luzhkov as Mayor
of Moscow, is depicted in the last plot. As a regional governor he was only included in the survey
for a few months until he was suddenly appointed to the position of the president’s chief of staff.
Then, after a short period as vice prime minister — of which there are several at any given time
— he returned to an influential position as mayor of Moscow. In general, these four plots clearly
16
follow the pattern we would expect from the hypothesised influence of office versus officeholder
in that office, thus adding confidence to the validity of the statistical model.
Office and Officeholder in Comparative Context
How applicable is this method of estimation to other political regimes? One of the observable
manifestations of deinstitutionalisation is when the highest political office is occupied by an of-
ficeholder whose authority is weaker than that of an effective, de facto leader in a nominally subor-
dinate office. Based on Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) data, in the 1946–2008 period 117
effective political rulers (nine percent of all country-year observations) are not the nominal heads
of government. Instead these rulers command their countries from different posts or may even
have no formal position at all. Alongside effective rulers, almost two hundred individuals occupy
the formal post of the head of government at various times. Medvedev’s presidency is represen-
tative of this phenomenon and clearly resembles the effective “national leader”–nominal president
pair in Table 2 that summarises instances of dubious or even outright impotent nominal leaders
across the world.8 Some de facto leaders rule from behind one nominal head, while others have
several during their often long tenure. Thus, Rafael Trujillo (1930–61) in the Dominican Republic
installed four different proxy presidents including his own brother to serve between his terms.
The difference between nominal and effective rulers provides prima facie evidence for regime
deinstitutionalisation, at least at the top ranks. Likewise, depending on the presence of particular
institutions, we can assign ordinal or categorical values (e.g. non-, weakly, under) to the degree of
8Sixty effective rulers (93 pairs) — leaders of the military, “paramount” leaders, even cabinet
ministers — occupy neither the national nor their party’s top post. In fact, one in every fourteen
nominal leaders at the very least is deprived significantly of policy influence.
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regime institutionalisation (Gandhi, 2008, 42–72). However, we do not know whether differences
between nominal and effective leaders exist among lower ranks, nor do we know the strength of
institutions overall or how the latter mitigate personalism. Based on the data of individual political
influence in Russia, we are able to do just that.
[Table 2 ABOUT HERE]
The data does not allow us to draw conclusions about the relative importance of office and
officeholder anywhere outside Russia. Nevertheless, nothing suggests that the method would not
be applicable in other contexts, provided that detailed indicators on the overall political influence
of a set of actors can be found over a sufficiently long time period. To gauge the validity of our
method we examined a similar survey, the annual ranking of the top 100 Ukrainians published
in Korrespondent weekly, available for the period 1993–2013, collecting and classifying office
categories in the same manner as we did for the Russian survey, as explained in the appendix.
The data for Ukraine is ordinal with the actors only assigned ranks from 1 to 100. We can-
not compare the scores in Russia with the Ukrainian ranks, however, the Russian survey already
includes ranks from 1 to 100 that are derived from the assigned scores. The distances between
average scores for the top ranked actors in Russia are larger than those for the lower ranked ones;
as it turns out, a simple log-transformation of ranks renders the distribution of the ranking variable
in Russia very similar to that of the scores.9 As can be seen in the last two columns of Table 1, the
estimation of the main model provides similar results when the logarithmically transformed ranks
are used compared to when raw scores are used. We therefore apply the same transformation to
Ukrainian ranks. This is further supported by the fact that both regimes have somewhat similar
9Regressing the ranks on the scores, controlling for the time spline, R2 = 0.75, which increases
to R2 = 0.94 when the log-transformation is applied to the ranks.
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institutional executive structures (e.g. the same three nominal offices at the top in both surveys),
even if the legislature is more prominent in Ukraine. Because we are no longer concerned with the
raw scores not having a fixed or constant reference scale, we omit the time spline since the ranking
does not contain this ambiguity. The results for the Ukrainian elite from 2003 are similar to that
for roughly the same timeframe in Russia from 2004. Neither regime is fully institutionalised and
even though office appears more important than officeholder overall, both Russian and Ukrainian
surveys feature businessmen and presidential affiliates in prominent ranks (e.g. in Ukraine in 2012
a personal friend and son of President Yanukovych are ranked at 3–4). Because we expect that
the institutionalisation of these two regimes is not dissimilar, the comparison gives us additional
confidence that the latent parameters we estimate indeed capture the importance of office and of-
ficeholder in Russia and therefore, its deinstitutionalisation.
Further Analyses and Discussion
The model specification is based on several assumptions, namely that (1) the overall influence
of individuals is independent of that of other individuals in the sample; (2) latent influence com-
ponents are independent of each other; (3) the influence to be derived from a particular office is
constant over time; (4) the authority of a particular individual is constant over time. How valid are
these assumptions?
To address the possible issue of interdependence of observations, we can modify the model to
account for patronage which is common in personalised regimes (Wright, 2008). Indeed, Putin’s
regime is underpinned by patron-client networks — a system of so-called “patronal presidential-
ism” (Hale, 2005) where the president plays the role of the arbiter. While there exist numerous
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studies about informal power relationships in the Kremlin (Petrov, 2011; Sakwa, 2011), these pro-
vide only subjective assessments. Indeed, how informal institutions and networks can be identified
and their effects studied is a major challenge to comparative politics (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006,
25–28). In simple terms, in addition to the powers of office and personal traits, we can posit that
individual influence is also driven by that of one’s patron. For instance, it is conceivable that the
officials closely affiliated with President Medvedev gained and then lost their overall influence
when their patron acquired and then departed the presidency.
We therefore collect an original data on patron-client relationships among the actors included
in the survey. In general, patrons are individuals that the media or biographical entries believe
to command the loyalty of particular clients, usually because the former brought them into either
politics or civil service. We identify one or two patrons, or none, for each individual. In some cases,
individuals do not have identifiable patrons while in other there is no reliable data on patronage, as
we explain in the appendix. We change the original specification as follows:
SCOREit = β0 +β1ηOjit +β2η
P
i +β3PAT RONi,t−1 +β4τt + εit , (3)
where PAT RON is the monthly lagged score of the patron(s). The PAT RON variable is set to zero
where an individual does not have a patron and the observation is list-wise removed when the
patron’s score is unavailable for another reason. The last column in Table 1 indicates that patron-
age does play a role in the explanation of individual influence. However, while the coefficient is
statistically significant, substantially it is dwarfed by the two main factors. The ζ-ratio is nearly
identical after accounting for patronage.
We are wary of including patronage in all specifications, however. In addition to losing ob-
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servations when patronage is not identified, it is also a very “soft” indicator. While there is an
agreement in the media about the identity of “clients” that came with Putin from Saint-Petersburg
for instance, and we attempted to validate patronage estimates from several sources, it is an in-
formal arrangement that changes over time and varies in degrees of affinity. In our analysis, the
assignment of a particular patron to a person is time-invariant and it is conceivable that clients can
have different patrons during their careers, or even turn against them.
The relationship between office, officeholder and patronage can be even more complicated
with personal qualities as well as patronage network relations determining office and vice versa.
Thus, the position in the informal elite network around the “patronal” president might determine
personal influence. Such informal networks can then be organised formally and determine the of-
ficial political posts obtained by individuals. If that is the case, the office component, and for that
matter, that of the officeholder, if we treat it conceptually different from patronage, is potentially
overestimated in our analyses. However, the fact that politically-connected businessmen feature
prominently in the survey indicates that not all individuals on this informal network, if it exists,
are granted formal powers. More importantly, because reliable data about informal networks is
not available by definition, we decided to base our estimations on what we can observe, such as
promotions and demotions, and to avoid subjective assessments. In addition to interdependence
between individuals, one might expect interdependence between the two latent factors. The fact
that an individual is a former prime minister will provide that person with a certain level of au-
thority which is not derived from the office held subsequently. Personal influence derived from the
sway of prior offices is still personal influence under our definition or, for that matter, under that of
philosophers in antiquity.10
10In antiquity, auctoritas was seen as the individual clout, experience and ability to influence
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Another important assumption underlying the model is that neither the powers of a particular
office nor the personal influence of a particular individual change over time. This assumption is
of course never fully satisfied. Individuals gradually gather experience and influence over time,
can suddenly be out of favour or end up embroiled in a scandal, gaining or losing their personal
clout. This is a strong restriction on the model that allows us to estimate the quantity of interest,
namely the overall level of regime deinstitutionalisation. We can, however, relax this assumption
and assume a linear time trend for each individual and each office in terms of their latent influence
scores. While this does not capture idiosyncratic variations over time, it does allow for the capture
of the gradual loss or gain of influence of particular individuals or offices. In real-life politics,
personal effects are certainly neither constant nor linear, they fluctuate, often dramatically. Some
of these variations will be reflected in personal approval ratings, and we do find in the appendix
that the latter contribute to the explanation of individual influence. The trend over time is modelled
as a random coefficient, such that the change over time differs by person and by office:
SCOREit = β0 +β1ηOjit + γ
O
jit t +β2η
P
i + γ
P
i t +β3τt + εit (4)
When we allow the time trend to vary randomly across individual officeholders as well as
offices, we obtain the ζ-ratio that is still greater than one but much diminished relative to the
original model, but the interpretation of the ζ-ratio is not clear in this model, since the calculation
of the ratio ignores the time trend itself. Regardless of the calculation of the ζ-ratio, however, the
policies. In contrast, the power of office was referred to as potestas or imperium. Consuls had
auctoritas before being elected but they gained potestas only after assuming office (Mommsen
1952, 1034, note 1.)
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fact that the coefficient for the latent officeholder variable changes substantially relative to that for
office suggests that incorporating a broader conception of personal influence into the model will
likely lead to a stronger relative impact of personal influence, and therefore the estimated degree
of deinstitutionalisation.
In general, making a number of restricting assumptions allows us to estimate the latent vari-
ables and their relative importance on average. Estimating models in which we allow a linear time
trend to vary across individuals does change the estimate of the ζ-ratio, with the officeholder be-
coming more important, while varying time trends for offices does not affect our main result. The
supplementary materials, in addition to details about the data, coding rules and tests of the ex-
pert survey validity, include several alternative model specifications that address the assumptions
discussed in this section.
Conclusions
There is a very old research programme that is concerned with the attempt to separate personal from
institutional components of political influence. Indeed, Machiavelli who recalled the debate among
ancient Romans as to whether it was the office of dictatorship alone that led to tyranny in Rome,
argued himself that Caesar would still have succeeded under some other rank because “it is easy
for force to acquire a title, but not for the title to acquire force” (Machiavelli 2003 [1513–19], 194).
Because of the numerous factors, often endogenous, that impact on how political influence depends
on the formal powers of office along with personal standing and traits (office and officeholder),
these two components are almost impossible to disentangle. By leveraging a uniquely fine-grained
dataset and making a number of restrictive assumptions, we are able to statistically estimate the
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relative importance of office and individual in Russia and, additionally, in Ukraine.
This paper provides a new tool for measuring the relative importance of different sources of
power, closely related to the level of regime institutionalisation. Looking at the ζ-ratio for the
Russian political elite, we find that office dominates officeholder, roughly by the order of two. This
finding holds for Russia under the Yeltsin presidency as well as under Putin and Medvedev despite
the fact that Russia changed dramatically between 1994 and 2011. The analysis of Ukrainian data
shows similar patterns. These results clearly indicate that in hybrid regimes such as Russia and
Ukraine, the degree of deinstitutionalisation is moderate. While personal attributes and patronage
networks matter significantly in determining individual influence on policy, the formal powers of
the office occupied are still more important.
Many nations suffer from significant deinstitutionalisation and the simultaneous development
of personalism (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007, 145); scholars often turn to subjective assessments
of deinstitutionalisation or make their inferences from the existence of particular institutions. Re-
sults obtained in this paper are certainly limited to Russia and Ukraine, however these results, and
the method that underpins them, will be of interest to comparativists who study the strength of
institutions across the world. Further research should establish whether this model can be used
on different measures of political influence and whether such analysis will lead to similar results
in different contexts. Likewise, our modelling strategy disentangles only time-invariant aspects of
personal influence. Future research should address whether short-term fluctuations in the individ-
ual’s political standing can be accounted for so that personal and institutional sources of influence
can be reliably estimated under different assumptions.
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Effective leader Nominal leader
party’s general-secretary–nominal leader pairs (103)
party’s general-secretary (57) prime minister or premier (91)
chairman of the (collective) presidency (10)
other (president of revolutionary council) (2)
“national leader”–nominal leader pairs (40)
“national leader” (23) president (19)
prime minister (7)
other (king, secretary of gen. people’s committee (14)
military ruler–nominal leader pairs (31)
military ruler (22) president (22)
prime minister (2)
other (e.g., military council) 7
prime minister–nominal leader pairs (11)
prime minister (8) king (7)
president (2)
other (e.g., president of presidium) (2)
other ruler–nominal leader pairs (11)
other (7) president (8)
king (2)
prime minister (1)
(117) (196)
Table 2: Nominal and Effective Heads of Government, 1946–2008. Note: Estimates are based on the
Democracy and Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). The original titles are aggregated in
this table into a smaller number of categories; we omit instances of foreign occupation. “National leaders” typically
do not occupy formal office albeit they often have exalted titles, for example, the Leader of the Revolution or the
paramount leader. The category of military rulers includes heads of the military, National Guard, military intelligence
and collective military rulerships. Other effective leaders are regents, religious leaders, heads of subnational units
and cabinet ministers. Also, the original dataset codes the nominal head of government rather than that of state. In
many cases, for example, presidential regimes, this is justified. In communist regimes, the constitutional head of
state is typically the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet (USSR) or the chairman of the PRC (China).
The de facto national leaders — almost always their party’s general secretaries — typically installed their loyalists
as the heads of state and government. Occasionally, rulers opted to keep the post of the head of state for themselves
(e.g. in USSR from 1977–85 and 1988–89). Thus, the effective-nominal heads of state pairs differ slightly from the
effective-nominal heads of government pairs, for example, ten instead of eight pairs in the case of China.
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Director of FSB
House speaker
Foreign minister
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vice PM
Interior minister
pres. chief of staff, deputy
head of state energy company
Prosecutor general
Min./Vice PM chief of staff
Senate speaker
Chairman of central bank
businessman
Head of elections com.
cabinet minister, various
Presid. property, head
head of state company, various
Security council secretary
leg. party leader, main
advisor to president
Governor of Chechnya
leg. party leader, various
other
separatist, Chechnya
assistant to president
legislator, various parties
head of federal agency, media
military general
federal plenipotentiary
former politician
regional governor, appointed
head of security/enforce. agency
media, various
Justice minister
chief justice, main court
civil servant, various
regional governor, elected
legislator, govt party
diplomat, various
regional politician
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cabinet minister, various
legislator, various parties
pres. chief of staff, 1st deputy
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regional governor, elected
head of federal agency, media
chief justice, main court
civil servant, various
media, various
Justice minister
regional politician
head of state company, various
1990s
Figure 1: Average Influence of Political Office, 1994–2011. Note: Empty space between lines contains
50 per cent of the distribution, median value in the middle. Lines extend to the lowest and highest values of scores,
excluding outliers. Political influence ranges on an interval scale between 1 and 10, raw scores are from VP-T. Single
office (occupied by one officeholder at any particular time) is denoted by capitalised first letters.
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Office A: Prime Minister
Time
1994 2011
Chernomyrdin
Kirienko
Primakov
Stepashin
Putin
Kasyanov
Fradkov
Zubkov
Office B: President chief of staff
Time
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 in
flu
en
ce
1994 2011
Office
Officeholder + Office
Raw scores
Filatov
Egorov
Chubais
Yumashev
Borduzha
Voloshin
Medvedev
Sobyanin
Naryshkin
Officeholder A: Sergey Sobyanin
2001 2011
regional governor, elected
President chief of staff
Min./Vice PM chief of staff
Moscow
mayor
Officeholder B: Yevgeny Primakov
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 in
flu
en
ce
1994 2010
Officeholder
Officeholder + Office
Raw scores
head of security/
enforce. agency
Foreign minister
Prime Minister
parl. party leader, pro−govt
civil servant, various
Figure 2: Relative Impact of Office and Officeholder, for Selected Offices and Individuals. Note: The
thin solid lines represent the sum of office- and officeholder-derived influence, with 95% confidence intervals based
on simulated parameters in light grey. The dotted line represents the residuals of regressing the raw influence scores
on the cubic time spline. These influence scores are scaled such that 10% of the values fall outside the plot, in order
to remove outliers. Therefore, only the trend over time, not the precise location, can be interpreted.
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